Early Buddhism: A New Approach by Sue Hamilton-Blyth

Author:Sue Hamilton-Blyth [Hamilton-Blyth, Sue]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780700713578
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2000-05-16T00:00:00+00:00

Notes

1 cf, for example, Collins (1982) pp. 98f and Gethin (1998) pp. 137f.

2 DN II 68.

3 See in particular the Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta, SN Vol IV: yaṃ dukkham tad anattā.

4 Yad anattā taṃ netam mama neso ham asmi na meso attāti.

5 Ajjhattam and bāhiram.

6 SN IV 14ff: sabba.

7 SN IV 19.

8 DN II 68: tad abhiññā vimutto bhikkhu na jānāti na passati iti ’ssa diṭṭhīti tad akallaṃ.

9 MN III 298ff.

10 For example, at MN I 139f: tasmātiha bhikkhave yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgata paccuppannaṃ, ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā, oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā, hīnaṃ vā paṇitaṃ vā, yaṃ dūre santike vā, sabbaṃ rūpaṃ: n’ etaṃ mama, n’eso ’ham asmi, na meso attā ti.

11 MN III 64; cf. also MN I 300; SN IV 31; AN III 444. My interpretation of this passage, and others relating to anattā, differs from that of Steven Collins (1982, pp. 95f.).

12 These two aspects of the cognitive process are referred to by the terms paá¹­ighasamphassa and achivacanasamphassa respectively, as previously mentioned.

13 For example, at MN I 167; Vin I 4.

14 AN II 161: appapañcaṃ papañceti.

15 Mahāniddesa, Vol I, p. 222. cf. also pp. 53–3. The Pali I have translated as ‘abstract impression’ is adhivacanasamphassa, which in other contexts refers to the way one abstractly conceptualises – thinks about – the factors of sensory experience also; Chapter Three, n.51, and n.12 above, cf. also DN II 62.

16 Paá¹­ighasamphassa.

17 In some later forms of Buddhism (and with a slightly differently context in certain other Indian traditions) the process of verbally differentiating is referred to in terms of grasper and grasped, indicating more overtly than in early Buddhism the way objectivity is linked with subjectivity.

18 In the Buddhist tradition, one would have a meditation teacher or spiritual guide who would assist in this.

19 MN I 56; DN II 292.

20 Sutta Nipāta 781: yathā jāneyya, tathā vadeyya

21 MN I 167: atakkāvacara.

22 This is Kalupahana’s translation (1975, p. 183).

23 See, for example, Rahula (1985) p. 26, and Gombrich (1996b) p. 40.

24 The Pali is etaṃ mama, eso ’ham asmi, eso me attā.

25 This is how I understand the use of the expression asati, as explained in Chapter One, n.14. Even if one takes it more literally as ‘does not exist’, the context requires that one understands this as ‘does not exist like that’ – i.e. permanently. Richard Gombrich (1996b, p. 38ff) also discusses this Sutta, saying of the Buddha: “… from the fact that there is a process of thinking he would refuse to draw the conclusion that ‘I exist’. But remember that for the Buddha existence implies stasis: it is the opposite of becoming.”

26 Sutta Nipāta 4. ‘Conceit’ is a common expression for thinking one is or has a permanent self: it alludes to self-centredness in the separative sense in every respect.

27 DN II 68.

28 cf., for example, DN III 136; MN I 431; SN II 223, V 418.

29 SN II 27.

30 Visuddhimagga p. 513.

31 Rahula, 1985, p. 26.

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